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ABSTRACT. The International  Whaling  Commission  (IWC)  met  in  Reykjavik, Iceland, in  May 1991 to determine whether  the  five-year  moratorium 
on commercial  whaling,  implemented  in 1986, was  to expire or be extended. Japan, Iceland  and  Norway  sought to resume  commercial  whaling 
on stocks of fin  and  minke  whales,  which  they  regard  as  capable of supporting commercial  harvest  without risk of extinction. The  IWC  voted  to 
extend  the  moratorium at least one  more  year. Iceland has subsequently  withdrawn  from  the WC,  and Norway  and  Japan are also  considering  withdrawal. 
A  bioeconomic  model is constructed  that  might be used to manage  the  industry if commercial  whaling is resumed. It is  applied to the  stock of minke 
whales  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic.  The optimal stock  and  level of  harvest depends  on  eight  bioeconomic parameters. For  a flFt with  average  productivity, 
the stock  ranged from 81 052 adult whales, supporting a  harvest of 137 animals, to 57 770 adult  whales, supporting a  harvest  of 1675. The price/cost 
ratio will be important  in  determining  the  optimal  stock  and  the  long-run  viability  of  whaling. 
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RÉSUMÉ. La  Commission  baleinikre  internationale  (CBI)  s’est  r6unie h Reykjavik, en Islande, en  mai 1 9 9 1 ,  pour  dkterminer si le moratoire de 
cinq  ans  sur la chasse  commerciale B la  baleine  devait expirer ou &re  prolong6. Le Japon, l’Islande et la  Norvkge  demandaient  la reprise de la 
chasse  commerciale des stocks de rorqual commun  et  de  petit rorqual, qui, d’aprks ces pays, sont capables de supporter une prise commerciale 
sans  risque  d’extinction.  La  CBI  a  vot6  pour  la  prolongation du moratoire pendant  au  moins un an. L’Islande  s’est par la suite retirk de la CBI, 
et le Japon  et  la  Norvkge  envisagent  de faire la  même  chose.  On construit un  modkle  bio-6conomique qui pourrait être utilis6  afin de g6rer  l’industrie 
si la  chasse  commerciale  reprend.’  On  l’applique  au  stock  du  petit rorqual de l’Atlantique du Nord-Est. Le stock optimal et le niveau des prises 
ddpendent de huit  paramktres  bio-6conomiques. Pour une flotte de  productivite  moyenne, le stock  va de 81 052 baleines  adultes  supportant  une prise 
de 137 animaux, B 57  770 baleines  adultes  supportant  une  prise de 1675 animaux. Le rapport prixko0t sera un facteur  important  qui d6teterminera 
le stock  optimal  et  la  viabilit6 B long terme de‘ la chasse d la baleine. 
Mots  cl6s: tkonomie, chasse commerciale B la baleine, petit rorqual 
Traduit pour le journal par  N6sida Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986 the  International  Whaling  Commission  (IWC)  declared 
a  five-year moratorium on commercial  whaling. The 
moratorium had been  adopted  for at least  three  reasons. First, 
there  was  scientific  evidence  that  many  of  the  stocks  of  baleen 
whales were dangerously depleted and making only slow 
recovery from the intensive whaling that had taken place 
between the two world wars and in the thirty-year period 
following World War II. In a special section of the Murine 
Fisheries Review, scientists  at  he U.S. National  Marine 
Mammal  Laboratory (1984) listed  eight  “great”  whales as being 
endangered:  the  blue, fin, right,  bowhead, sei, sperm,  hump- 
back  and  gray  whales. 
Second,  there  was  a  conspicuous  lack  of  information  on  the 
status  of  many  stocks.  Each  of  the  endangered  species  had  two 
or more  “unit stocks,” thought to be sufficiently  independent 
of other  stocks  that  they  could  be  managed  independently.  Of 
the 34 unit  stocks  listed by the U.S. National  Marine  Mammal 
Laboratory in 1984, there was insufficient information on 
13 stocks  to  estimate  pristine  (original) or current  population 
numbers. 
Third, and  perhaps  most  important,  the  whale  had  become 
a  powerful  symbol  within  the  environmental  movement. For 
many  the  depleted  stocks  of  baleen  whales,  in.particular  the  blue 
whale,  typified  the “tragic” result  of  man’s  exploitation  of  the 
environment and common property resources (see McVay, 
1966; Small, 1971). 
During  the  moratorium  several  countries,  including  Iceland, 
Japan and Norway,  continued to harvest  a  limited  number  of 
whales  for  research  purposes.  Japan’s  “scientific  whaling”  was 
the  most  controversial. In 1987 Japan  submitted  a  proposal  to 
kill 900 whales  for  research  purposes.  The  IWC  rejected the 
proposal  and  Japan  countered  with  a  reduced  scientific  harvest 
of 300 whales. This too  was  rejected  by  the  IWC.  The  Japanese 
filed a  formal  objection and proceeded  to  harvest  over 300 whales 
in 1987. After  determining  the  sex,  length,  weight,  approximate 
age  and  pregnancy  status  of  females,  the  whales  were  butchered 
and the meat  was  sold  for  human  consumption  through  fish 
markets  in  Japan. 
While many  questioned the motive,  number  and  even the need 
to  kill  whales  for  research  purposes, it was  agreed  that  when 
the  IWC  met  in 1991 new  stock  assessments  would be presented. 
Information  on  pregnancy  rates,  natural  mortality  and  other  “life 
history  parameters” would be  needed  to  construct  models  of 
population  dynamics  that  could  be  used  to  simulate the effect 
of  alternative  harvest  rates.  If  commercial  whaling  were 
resumed,  it  would be from  stocks  that  were  abundant and at 
rates that would pose little or no risk of extinction. Prime 
candidates for harvest  were  the  minke  whale  in  the  Atlantic, 
Pacific and Southern oceans (around Antarctica), the sperm 
whale  and  the  fin  whale  off  the  coast  of  Iceland. 
Scientists  from  Japan,  Iceland  and  Norway  arrived  in 
Reykjavik in May 1991 with  statistical  studies  and  computer 
simulations to back  their  claims  that  commercial  whaling  could 
be  resumed  without  risking  extinction  (Kasamatsu et al. , 1991; 
Institute  of  Cetacean  Research, 1991; (Bien, 1991). The IWC 
was  more  cautious  and  voted  to  extend  the  moratorium  for  at 
least  another  year.  Former  whalers  in  Norway  threatened to 
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resume  coastal  whaling  immediately,  and  in  December  1991 
Iceland  announced  its  intention to withdraw from the IWC. 
This  paper  examines the economic  motivations of the 
countries  that  wish  to  resume  commercial  whaling  and  estimates 
the net revenue  for  the  Norwegian  small  whale fishery, based 
on  harvests  from  the  stock of  minke  whales  in  the  Northeast 
Atlantic. We identify the sustainable  levels for stock, harvest 
and  fleet size if one  sought to maximize the present  value of 
net revenues. Sensitivity analysis reveals when whaling is 
optimal  and  when  it is not optimal  on  purely  economic  grounds. 
There is, of course, a more  fundamental question. Should 
commercial  whaling  be  resumed  at all? This question  has  been 
answered  differently by different countries and by the sume 
country at different times. It is unlikely  that the U . S. will  ever 
resume  commercial  whaling,  even if certain  stocks,  such  as  the 
gray  whale,  have  recovered to near pristine population  levels. 
But it would  seem likely  that  Norway,  Iceland or Japan will 
resume  commercial  whaling  within  the year. What  will  be  the 
response of a nonwhaling country, like the U.S.,  to a country 
that  resumes  whaling?  Are  trade  sanctions  likely  to  be  employed 
and are they appropriate? 
MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL  WHALING: 
THE  MINKE  WHALE 
The minke  whale (Balaenoptera  acutorostrata) is the  smallest 
of  the rorquals, a group  that  includes  the  blue, fin and  sei  whales. 
Being the smallest, it  was the  last to be  intensively  harvested 
by  whalers  working  the  Southern Ocean in the mid-20th  century 
(Clark  and  Lamberson,  1982).  The  population i  the Northern 
Hemisphere is generally thought to be separate from the 
population in the Southern Hemisphere. The delineation of 
separate  stocks  in the North  Atlantic is subject to debate, but 
the IWC recognizes four stocks defined by area as 1) the 
Canadian  east  coast stock, 2)  the  West  Greenland stock, 3) the 
Central  North  Atlantic  stock  and 4) the  Northeast  Atlantic  stock 
(Wall& et al., 1987:7). This latter stock  winters  in  the  North 
Atlantic  and  then  migrates  along the coast of  Norway into the 
Barents  Sea  in  the spring and  summer. 
The  minke  whale  was  never  listed  as  an  endangered species, 
and in the Southern  Hemisphere the population is thought to 
be in excess  of 600 OOO individuals (Woods Hole  Oceanographic 
Institution, 1989). Most of the  whales  harvested by Japan for 
scientific purposes were minke whales from the Southern 
Hemisphere. Norway has harvested minke whales from the 
Northeast  Atlantic  stock  since  the  1930s,  and  between  1938  and 
1986  over  100 OOO animals  were  harvested. To examine  the 
impact of these harvests  and to estimate  the current population 
size, we  adopt a model  used  to describe the  dynamics of baleen 
whales  and  then calibrate it for the  stock of  minke  whales  in 
the  Northeast  Atlantic. 
Estimates of the  Minke  Whale  Stock 
in the Northeast  Atlantic 
The  dynamics of a single  baleen  whale  population are often 
modeled  using a delay-difference  equation (Clark, 1976). It is 
well  known  that  many  species  of  baleen  whale are competitors 
for the same food sources. Thus, the minke whale might 
compete  with  the  blue or fin  whale for capelin, herring or cod. 
A complete multispecies model would involve a system of 
simultaneous  delay-difference  equations,  with  interaction  terms 
between  the  various  species.  Such a model is presently  beyond 
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our ability to empirically estimate and, from an economic 
perspective, to optimize. We therefore restrict ourselves  to the 
dynamics of a single species, modeled  by a delaydifference 
equation  taking the general form 
X,,,, = (1 - M)X, + F(X,-$ (1) 
where X, is the stock of adult (sexually mature) whales in 
year t, M is the annual rate of mortality in adults, and F(X,,) 
is a recruitment function defining the recruits to the adult 
population  in  year  t +1 as a function of the adult  population in 
year t-7. The recruitment  function is assumed to incorporate 
certain environmental constraints, including  the  overall 
availability of food and its effect on the relative rate of 
population growth. 
If the  adult  population is unchanging  over  some interval of 
time, then  natural  mortality is precisely  offset by recruitment 
and MX, = F(X,,). The equilibrium or fixed point, X,, will 
be  stable if IF '(X,,) I e M, where F 'e) is the first derivative of 
FP). This equilibrium is sometimes referred to as the pristine 
population,  thought to exist prior to the start of commercial 
exploitation. 
With a commercial  harvest of Y, <X, adult  whales per year, 
it is useful to define escapement as Z, = X,-Y, > O .  
Equation (1) is then  modified to become 
X,,,, = (l")Z, + F<Z,J  (2) 
Thus, the adult stock in year t+  1 is determined by the 
unharvested  adults  that survive from year t, plus recruitment, 
which  is a function of escapement in year t-7. 
The generalized logistic function is often used  in  modeling 
whale  populations. In this case the  recruitment  function  becomes 
F(X,-,_$ = rX,-,[1-(&$WI (3) 
where r is  the  intrinsic  growth rate and K is a positive  parameter, 
which  along  with r, M and a, defines  the pristine population. 
The value of a will affect the  symmetry  of F(X,-,). If a > 1, 
the  generalized  logistic is skewed  to the left  and  the  maximum 
recruitment  level ies above 0.5K. The IWC believes  maximum 
recruitment occurs at about 0.6K, which is the case when 
a = 2.39. For the generalized  logistic  the pristine population 
is given by X, = K[(r-M)/r]*'". 
In addition to a, the parameters M, r, K and 7 must be 
estimated  if one wishes to simulate  population  dynamics  using 
the  generalized  logistic.  Unfortunately,  biological  estimates for 
all of these  parameters are not  available.  We  will  make  use  of 
the  best  estimates  for M and rand then  simulate  the  minke  whale 
population for alternative values of r and K to see  which  values 
yield a simulated value for the population in 1990 that is 
consistent  with  population  estimates from other methods. 
Wall& et al. (1987)  use  an  annual  mortality rate of 0.10 in 
their study  of the minke  whale  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic.  The 
age at sexual  maturity appears to vary by sex, with  females 
reaching  maturity at about 7 years  and  males at about 6 years 
of age (Christensen, 1981). We set M = 0.10 and 7 = 7. 
The Norwegian  government  has  recorded data on the  number 
of  minke  whales  harvested  from  1938 to 1989.  These  data are 
shown in Figure 1 and come from Bien et al. (1987) and 
Statistisk  Sentralbyrh  (1989).  (The  actual  numerical  data are 
available from the first author upon request.) With a = 2.39, 
M = 0.10, and r = 7, we  ran  numerous  simulations for various 
combinations of r and K. In  each  simulation  it was  assumed 
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FIG. I .  Harvest of minke whales from the Northeast Atlantic stock. 
that  the  stock  was  in  pristine  equilibrium  at X, for  the  years 
before and including 1938. The number of whales  harvested 
was deducted from each successive value of X, in order to 
calculate  the  level  for  escapement  as  needed  in  equation (2) to 
obtain X, + 1. 
The  results  when  r = 0.15 and K = 130 000 are plotted  in 
Figure 2. The  parameter  values  imply  a  pristine  population  level 
of X, = 82  093 adult  whales  and  a 1990 population of 58 742 
mature animals. The simulated population of minke whales 
declines  from  the  pristine  population  to  a low  of  slightly  less 
than 52 000 whales in 1973, after which it slowly climbs to 
58 742 adults in 1990. 
pien (1991), using the “line  transect”  methodology,  estimates 
a total population of 34 600 minke whales in the Northeast 
Atlantic  in 1989. His  analysis  presumes  that  all  whales  along 
a  line are in  fact  sighted.  It  is  well  known  that  visibility,  rough 
seas  and  submerged  whales  result  in  a  downward  bias  to  the 
number of whales actually observed along a transect line. 
Schweder et al. (1991) provide  a 95 % confidence  estimate  of 
0.36-0.49 for  the  fraction  of  whales  actually  observed.  When 
this interval  is  applied  to  @en’s  estimate,  one  obtains  an  interval 
estimate  of 70  612 to 96 1 1  1 animals  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic 
population.  Our 1990 estimate  of 58  742 adult  minke  whales 
thus  seems  conservative  when pien’s estimate  is  adjusted  for 
observation  bias. 
A  Bioeconomic  Model of the Minke  Whale 
in  the Northeast  Atlantic 
To examine  the  value  to  Norway  of  a  resumption  of  its  small 
whale  fishery  based  on  the  minke  whale,  we  next  develop  a 
“bioeconomic”  model  with  the  objective  being  the  maximimtion 
of discounted  net  revenue.  This  model  assumes  that  either the 
IWC or the  Norwegian  government  will  regulate  total  harvest 
through  limited  entry  and  a  system  of  individual  transferable 
quotas  (ITQs).  The  maximization  of  the  present  value  of  net 
revenue  will  imply  values  for  the  stock f minke  whales,  annual 
harvest and vessel  numbers  that  maximize  the  net  economic 
value  of  the  resource.  This  objective  might  be  criticized  as  being 
overly  narrow.  It  does  not  consider  the  “existence  value” of 
whales or the  value  of  employment  in  the  whaling  industry. 
While  these  values are likely  to  be  important,  they  are  also  very 
difficult  to  quantify. By solving  the  present  value  problem  first, 
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FIG. 2. Estimated  population of minke  whales  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic stock. 
we  can  examine  the  solution  and  see if it  needs  to  be  adjusted 
to  account  for  existence or employment  values. 
The  model  to  be  constructed  is  similar  to  those  described y 
Clark (1990). It  assumes  that  the  price  per  harvested  whale  is 
constant, denoted by p, and that the cost of harvesting yt 
whales from a population of size X, is given by the cost 
function  C(Y,,X,).  Net  revenue  in  year  t  may  be  written as 
Maximization  of  the  present  value  of  net  revenue  subject  to 
the  dynamics of the  whale  population  may  be  stated  as 
00 
Maximize e‘r(Y, ,X,) 
t =o 
Subject to X,+1 = (1 - M)Z, + F(Z,-$ 
z, = x, - Yt 
where e = l/(l + 6) is  a  discount  factor  and 6 is  the  rate  of 
discount. 
Conrad (1989) derives  the  first-order  necessary  conditions 
for this problem. When they are evaluated in steady state, 
optimal  escapement  will  be  defined by the  equation 
1?][1 - M + erF’(Z)] = 1 + 6 
where rx and ry are the partial derivatives of r(Y,X) and 
F  ’(Z)  is  the  first  derivative of the  recruitment  function. 
Suppose  the  production  function  relating  harvest  to  stock  size 
and  effort  takes  the  exponential  form  Y = X( 1 - e-qE),  where 
E  is  the  level  of  effort  and  the  parameter  q > 0 might be referred 
to as the  “catchability  coefficient.” If the  unit  cost  of  effort  is 
constant,  denoted by c, then  the  cost  equation  is  C = cE.  Solving 
the  production  function  for  E as a  function  of  Y  and  X  and 
substituting into the cost equation yields the cost function, 
C = (c/q)ln[X/(X - Y)], where In[*] denotes the natural log 
operator.  Substituting  the  cost  function  into  the  expression  for 
net revenue results in the partial derivatives r, = cY/[qX- 
(X - Y)] and ay = [pq(X - Y) - c]/[q(X - Y)]. When these 
partial  derivatives are substituted  into  equation (5), and  noting 
Z = X - Y,  it  is  possible  to  derive  an  expression  defining X 
as a  function  of  Z. (A detailed  derivation  is  available  from  the 
first  author.)  This  takes  the  form 
Z[l-M+prr(l-(a+l)(Z/K)")] 
(p/c)qZ[eTr(l-(a+l)(Z/K)a) - (6+M)]+(1+6) 
X =  (6) 
Evaluating  the  delay-difference  equation  in  steady  state,  it  is 
possible  to  obtain  an  expression  defining  Y  as  a  function  of Z.
This  is  less  tedious  algebraically and takes the form 
Y = [r - M - r(Z/K)"]Z  (7) 
By substituting  the  last  two  expressions  into  the  definition  of 
escapement, we can obtain a single expression in Z. Unfor- 
tunately,  it  is  not  possible to obtain an explicit  expression  for 
optimal  escapement,  but we can  write  the  implicit  form as 
G(Z) = e(z)KP/c)qz[+(z) - (6 + MI1 + (1 + a  
-11 - M + + ( a 1  (8) 
where  +(Z) = err( l-(a+l)(Z/K)") and  O(Z) = l+r-M-r(Z/K)". 
Optimal  escapement  is  a  root r zero  of G(Z). If  a  root  exists, 
the  optimal  values  of  X  and  Y  can  be  obtained  from  equations 
(6) and (7). 
The  optimal  level  of  escapement  depends  on  the  five  biolog- 
ical parameters a, M, r, K and T and on three economic 
parameters, q, (p/c)  and 6 .  With our simulated  values  for  the 
minke  whale  stock,  we are in  a  position to directly  estimate  a 
production  function.  While  this  stock was harvested  commer- 
cially  until  1988, the fleet  of  Norwegian  vessels  came  under 
quota restrictions as early as 1973 (Wall$e et al., 1987). 
We opted for a sample period of  1952-72  and estimated 
the  exponential  production  function  Y = X(l - e-qE)  by 
regressing  ln[(X - Y)/X]  on effort, E, measured as the  number 
of  vessels.  This  time  series  is  plotted  in  Figure 3. The  data  on 
vessel  numbers  comes  from  Statistisk  Sentralbyrh  (1978,  1989). 
One  would  anticipate  a  negative  coefficient  on  effort  and  an 
insignificant  constant. 
The  results are shown  in  Table 1, which  reports  the  ordinary 
least  squares (OLS) regressions  with  and  without  correction  for 
first-order autocorrelation. The estimate for q is 2.7045E-4 
without  correction  and  2.4465E-4  with  correction,  and  both  are 
significant  at  the  1 % level.  The  constant  is  not  significant  at 
the 5% level in either regression and is dropped from the 
equation.  In  the  numerical  analysis  that  follows  the  catchability 
coefficient  will  be  set at 2.OE-4,  2.5E-4  and  3.OE-4  in order 
to  examine  the  sensitivity  of  stock,  harvest  and  vessel  numbers 
to  changes  in  q. 
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FIG. 3.  The number of Norwegian vessels harvesting minke whales. 
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TABLE 1. Estimation  of  the  catchability  coefficient for  the  exponential 
production  function Y = X(l - eqE) for  the period 1952-72, where Y 
is harvest, X is  the  estimated  stock and E is the number of vessels 
A. No correction for autocorrelation 
Variable Coefficient Standard  error  -ratio
E -2.7045E-4  0.49360E-4  -5.4790 
constant -7.6683E-3  7.99220E-3  -0.9595 
R-square = 0.6124 R-square  djusted = 0.5920 F = 30.02 
Durbin-Watson = 1.1562 
B. Correction for first-order autocorrelation 
Variable Coefficient Standard  error  -ratio
E -2.4465E-4 0.61141E-4 -4.0014 
constant -1.1557E-2 9.96360E-3 -1.1599 
rho 0.33145 0.20588 1.6099 
R-square = 0.6559 R-square  adjusted = 0.6378 
Durbin-Watson = 1.6454 
The  relative  price-cost  ratio  (p/c)  was  calculated  for  the  years 
1980-87.  Table 2 contains  data  on  the  total  number  of  whales 
taken by vessels  in  the  small-whale  fleet  and  the  total  revenue 
(in  nominal  Norwegian  kroner)  obtained  from  meat  and  blubber. 
Dividing  total  revenue by the  number  of  whales, we obtain  a 
price  per  whale.  Table  2  also  contains  estimates of th  operating 
cost  of  a  small-whale  vessel  for  an  entire  season of approxi- 
mately  36  weeks.  During  each  season  vessels  would  typically 
participate  in  other  fisheries.  It was estimated  that  during  this 
period approximately' 35-41 % of operating time was spent 
whaling.  The  p/c  ratios  in  the  right-most  column  of  Table  2  are 
calculated by dividing  price  per  whale by cost  per  vessel. If 
it  were  appropriate  to  prorate  costs  to  different  fisheries by th ir 
percentage  of  time  during  a  full  season,  then  the  (p/c)  ratios 
might increase by a factor of U(0.38) = 2.63. We set (p/c) 
at 0.05, 0.07 and 0.09, which, as it  turns out, covers  a  critical 
range  of  operating  behavior  and  resource  management. 
The  final  economic  parameter  needed to calculate  optimal 
escapement  is 6 ,  the  discount  rate.  In our sensitivity  analysis, 
we  set 6 at 0.02,0.04 and 0.06. A simple  interactive  algorithm 
was  developed  to  find  the  zero  of  G(Z)  in  equation (8), which 
proved  to  be  unique  and  stable.  The  results  are  displayed in 
Table 3. 
There are three blocks to Table 3 corresponding to the 
base-case  q = 2.5E-4, then  a  less  productive  fleet (q = 2.OE-4) 
and  a  more  productive  fleet  (q = 3.OE-4).  Within each  block 
the  price-cost  ratio  is  varied  vertically  and  the  discount  rate 
horizontally. For the  base-case  q  and  the  median  values  of  (p/c) 
and 6 ,  the  optimal  stock  is 68 142  adult  whales  supporting  a 
harvest  of  1297  adults  taken by 77  catcher  boats.  Within  the 
base-case  q  block,  the  optimal  stock  ranges  from  a  high  level 
of 81 052  whales  (at  [p/c] = 0.05 and 6 = 0.02)  to  a low of 
57  770  whales  (at  [p/c] = 0.09 and 6 = 0.06).  The  high  stock 
was  associated  with  a  harvest  of  137  whales  taken by 7 catcher 
boats, while the low stock was associated with a harvest 
1675 whales taken by 118  vessels. 
When  the  catchability  coefficient is r e d u d  to q = 2.0E-4, we 
observe  @at  whaling  becomes  unprofitable  at  the  low  price-cost 
ratio.  In  the  long  run  the  stock  returns  to X,, = 82  093  whales. 
In  general, the reduction  in  q  causes  an  increase  in  the  optimal 
stock  and  a  decrease  in  harvest  and  fleet  size, ceteris paribus. 
The  case  where  whaling  becomes  unprofitable  due  to  a low 
price-cost  ratio may be  of  relevance  if  commercial  whaling  is 
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TABLE 2. The  price-cost  tatio  (p/c)  for  the  period 1980-87 
Number of Value of Price  per  Cost
Year whales'  al products*  whale ( P ) ~  vessel ( c ) ~  pic 
1980 2  054  39  66  OOO 19 308 
1981 1 890 
756  805 0.0255 
35 119 OOO 18 899 945  557 0.0200 
1982 1 963  3 831 OOO 20  293 
1983 1 869 
952 142 0.0213 
45  617 OOO 24  407 940  714 0.0259 
1984  804  32  681 OOO 40  648 802 423 0.0510 
1985 17 1 34 626 OOO 44 910 1007 118 0.0450 
1986  383 20  489 OOO 53  496 
1981 
846 068 0.0632 
315 21 294 OOO 56  784  944 670 0.0601 
The  number of whales  listed  in  this  table  includes  the  harvest of minke  whales 
from  the  Northeast  and  Central  Atlantic  stock.  Source:  Statistisk  Sentralbyrh, 
1989. 
*The primary  products  from  the  minke  whale  are  meat  and  blubber,  which  are 
consumed  by  Norwegians  or  exported  to  Japan  for  human  consumption. Less 
than 1 % by  weight is  processed  into animal feed. This  value  is  given innominal 
Norwegian kroner. Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrh, 1989. 
The  price  per  whale, p, is  calculated  by  dividing  the  value of whale  products 
by the number of whales  harvested. 
4During  the  period  1980-87 vessels in the Norwegian coastal fleet operated 
approximately  36  weeks per year.  The  cost  estimates  listed  here  are  operating 
costs for the entire 36-week season. During such a season a vessel would 
typically  spend  35-41 % of its  time  whaling.  The  rest of the  time  was  spent 
harvesting cod, haddock,  herring  and  other species. The  distribution of costs 
among  these  fishing  activities  is  problematic.  If it were  appropriate to calculate 
whaling  cost  as  season  cost  times  the  proportion of time  spent  whalihg,  it  would 
more than double the pic ratios listed in the right-most column. Source: 
Budsjettnemda for Fiskenaxingen, 1981-88. 
resumed.  In 1981, when  a  total  of 1890 whales  were  harvested 
from  Northeast and Central  stocks  (see  Table 2), the  adjusted 
price-cost  ratio would  have  been (2.63).(0.02) = 0.0526. At 
this  ratio  whaling  would  have  been  unprofitable  for  vessels  with 
It  is  not  possible  to  estimate  q  for  later  years,  since  the  catchers 
were  constrained by quota.  It  is  believed  that  as  newer  catchers 
replaced  older  vessels,  q  increased.  The  five-year  moratorium, 
however, may  have  had  the  effect  of  reducing  the  efficiency 
of both catchers that have been idle or regeared for other 
fisheries and their  crews. 
It  is also not  known  what the price  elasticity  for  whale  meat 
will  be  in  the  primary  fish  markets  of  Japan.  If  Japan  resumes 
whaling  from  the  stock  of  minke  whales  that  migrates  through 
their coastal waters or from the vast stock in the Southern 
Hemisphere, and if markets are slow  to  expand  and  demand 
is  inelastic,  the  resumption of commercial  whaling  may  be  short 
lived  for  purely  economic  reasons. 
The  fmal  block  in  Table 3 corresponds  to  the  high-productivity 
case.  Here  the  optimal  stock may fall as low as 51 538 whales, 
slightly below the minimum of our simulation in Figure 2. 
This  stock  would  be  optimal  under  a  high  price-cost  ratio  and 
a  high  discount  rate.  In  this  case 1736 whales are harvested by 
114 vessels. At the  other  extreme,  a  (PIC) =0.05 and 6 = 0.02, 
the  optimal  stock  is 74 353, supporting  a  harvest  of 853 whales 
by 38 vessels. 
These  results  seem  plausible  in  light  of  the  historical  landings 
shown  in  Figure 1. Annual  harvests  that  exceeded 2000 whales 
during  the 1950s and 1960s caused  the  stock to decline  to  about 
52  000 whales by the  mid-1960s.  Harvests  around 1500 during 
the 1970s appear,  in  our  simulation, to have  been  sustainable. 
It  would  also  appear  that  the  range  of  solutions to the  present 
value  maximization  problem  might  also  satisfy  the  objectives 
of  stock  maintenance  and  employment,  discussed  earlier.  Under 
none  of  the  parameter  combinations  in  Table 3 does  the  adult 
stock  decline  below 50  000 adults.  Fleets of 70-80 vessels  would 
q = 2.OE-4. 
TABLE 3. The optimal stock, X, harvest, Y, and effort, E, in the 
Norwegian minke whale fishery for the bioeconomic model with 
a = 2.39, r = 0.15, K = 130 000, M = 0.10, r = 7 and  alternative 
values  of q, 6 and p/c 
With q = 2.5E-4 
6 = 0.02 6 = 0.04 6 = 0.06 
X = 81 052 X = 80 995 X = 80941 
plc = 0.05 Y = 137 Y = 145 Y = 151 
E =  7 E =  7 E =  8 
X = 69 412 X = 68 142 X = 67 041 
plc = 0.07 Y = 1217 Y = 1 291 Y = 1 356 
E = 71 E = I1 E = 82 
X = 62 135 x = 59 977 X = 51  770 
E = 100 E = 110 E = 118 
pic = 0.09 Y = 1 543  Y = 1 621 Y = 1 675 
With q = 2.0E-4 
6 = 0.02 6 = 0.04 6 = 0.06 
X = 82093 X = 82093 X = 82093 
pic = 0.05 Y =  0 Y =  0 Y =  0 
E =  0 E =  0 E =  0 
X = 76160 X = 76 376 X = 76 043 
pic = 0.07 Y = 627 Y = 666 Y = 698 
E = 41 E = 44 E = 46 
X = 68648 X = 61 115 X = 65 960 
plc = 0.09 Y = 1 268 Y = 1 350 Y = 1 410 
E = 93 E = 101 E = 108 
With q = 3.OE-4 
6 = 0.02 6 = 0.04 6 = 0.06 
X = 14 353 X = 13 713 X = 13 172 
pic = 0.05 Y = 853 Y = 908 Y = 952 
E = 38 E = 41 E = 44 
X = 64 453 X = 62 120 X = 60 236 
pic = 0.07 Y = 1 478 Y = 1 565 Y = 1 621 
E = 77 E = 85 E = 91 
X = 58 614 X = 54 637 X = 51 538 
pic = 0.09 Y = 1 659 Y = 1719 Y = 1 736 
E = 96 E = 107 E = 114 
be  consistent  with  stocks  of 67 OOO to 70 OOO adult  animals  and 
a  per  vessel  harvest  of 16-17 whales. 
The  price-cost  ratio  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  value  of 
the  Norwegian  small-whale  fishery.  With  a  price  of 50 OOO NK 
per  whale  and  a  seasonal  operating  cost of 714  286 NK,  the 
value of the price-cost ratio is 0.07. With q = 2.5E-4 and 
6 = 0.04, the optimal stock is X = 68  142 whales with a 
harvest of Y = 1297. (This solution is in the second row, 
second column, of the first block of Table 3.) The annual 
net  revenue  is ?r = pY - (c/q)ln[X/(X - Y)] = 9 943  530 NK. 
The present value (or asset value) of the fishery would be 
~ ( 1  + 6) /6  = 258 531 788. At an exchange rate of 6.5 NK 
= 1 USD, these  values  translate  to  an  annual  net  revenue  of 
$1  529  75 1 and  a  present  value  of $39  774  12 1. 
If the  market  value  of  an  average  whale  falls  to p = 35 714 
NK, and if seasonal  operating  cost  is  unchanged,  then p/c = 
0.05. If the  other  parameters are unchanged,  the  optimal  adult 
stock and harvest are 80  995 and 145 respectively. (This 
corresponds to the optimal solution shown in the first row, 
second  column,  of  the  first  block  of  Table 3.) The annual  net 
’ 
revenue drops to 58  989 NK, or a present  value of 1 533  735 
NK. This translates to an annual net revenue of  only $9075, 
or a present  value of $235 959. 
At the other extreme, if the price per whale increases to 
64 285 NK, and  seasonal  cost  remains  at 714  286 NK,  then  the 
price-cost ratio equals 0.09. For unchanged  values  of q and 6 
the  optimal  adult  stock is 59  977, with a harvest of 1627 whales 
(first block, third row, second  column of Table 3). The.annual 
net  revenue increases to 26  015  101 NK for a present value of 
676  392  643 NK. These translate  to $4 002 323 and 
$104 060 406 respectively. 
From the above analysis it would appear, even under the 
narrow  objective of present  value  maximization,  that  the  stock 
of minke  whales  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic  will  not  be  threatened 
with extinction. At the highest values for q, pic, and 6 the 
optimal  stock is 51  538 adults, which is 62.7% of the pristine 
adult  population  of 82 093. The  value  of  the  fishery wiU critically 
depend  on the price-cost ratio. For a p/c of 0.05 or less there 
may be little or no profit in whaling,  and  with zero harvest  the 
stock  will equilibrate at the pristine population  level. 
WHALING AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 
If the sperm whale  and certain stocks of baleen  whale  have 
recovered to near  pristine levels, and if the IWC or a nation 
state is capable of managing a whale  population so as to avoid 
open  access  dynamics  and  the risk of extinction, then  many 
biologists would conclude there is no  scientific  basis  to  prevent 
the resumption of comhercial whaling. A permanent  mora- 
torium  on  commercial  whaling  must be based  on animal welfare 
or animal rights  arguments.  There  is  an  important  philosophical 
difference between a human  concerned  with  animal  welfare  and 
a human  advocating  animal  rights. From an  economic  point of 
view, the utility of the human concerned  with  animal  welfare 
is  influenced by the  condition  and  treatment of other animal 
species. This philosophical perspective might be akin to an 
“interspecific altruism or paternalism.” Depending on the 
degree or form of altruism, there may  be circumstances  where 
a human concerned with animal welfare might condone the 
killing  and  use of another animal  species. 
This would  not  be permissible to a human  advocating  animal 
rights. To such a human, all animals are entitled to the same 
rights  as  exercised by the  species homo sapiens. There need 
not be any  altruism or species  paternalism  on  the part of  humans, 
because all animals are entitled to exercise their “natural” 
behavior  without the threat of “unnatural” death from man. 
If a sufficient  number of humans are concerned  with  animal 
welfare or advocate  animal rights, then a society  might  collec- 
tively  choose  to  ban  the  killing  of  some r all animals. The  extent 
to which a concern  for animal welfare or a belief  in animal rights 
exists  within a society  will  vary  from culture to culture at a point 
in  time  and  may  change  within a culture  through  time.  The U . S . 
passed the Marine  Mammals  Protection  Act (“PA) in 1972. 
Only 80 years  earlier  U. S. whalers  working  out  of  San  Francisco 
were  trying to harvest  the  remaining  members of the stock of 
bowhead  whales  in  the  western  Arctic  to  provide  baleen for the 
manufacture of corsets (see  Bockstoce, 1986). It was clear  that 
the  stock of bowheads had been depleted, but there was no 
outcry for conservation or animal  welfare. 
A majority of citizens  in the U.S. no longer  see the need to 
commercially  harvest  whales or other  marine  mammals  and 
have  made  commercial  harvest  within  U.S. territorial waters 
THE MINKE WHALE AND COMMERCIAL WHALING / 169 
illegal. The majority of citizens in Norway,  Iceland  and  Japan 
apparently do not  perceive  commercial  whaling  as  undesirable 
or immoral. They  view  it as a way  of  earning  income,  obtaining 
a valuable  source of  protein or, in  the  case of Japan,  constituting 
an  important part of the cultural and  religious fabric of  those 
few  communities  where  coastal  whaling is still  practiced  (see 
Glass and Englund, 1989). 
How will citizens of a nonwhaling country, such as the 
U.S., view the decision  of Japan,  Iceland or Norway to resume 
commercial whaling? What has been the response of the 
U.S. government in the past, and what actions are likely if 
commercial  whaling is resumed? 
There are two  U.S.  federal  statutes  that  have  been  employed 
as an  economic  threat to whaling  countries  (McDorman, 1991). 
The first is the 1971 Pelly Amendment, which was initially 
proposed out of a concern over the diminished stocks of 
Atlantic salmon. In 1969 the International Commission for 
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) placed a ban on 
salmon  fishing  on the high seas, which were  generally  beyond 
a 12 nautical mile limit that then defined territorial waters. 
Denmark,  Norway  and  West  Germany  objected  to  the  proposed 
ban.  Under  ICNAF procedures, objecting  countries  were not 
legally  bound by the ban.  Congressman  Thomas  M.  Pelly felt 
that the U.S. needed to add teeth to ICNAF’s conservation 
efforts and proposed amendments to the 1967 Fisherman’s 
Protection Act that would prohibit the import of fish from 
countries in alleged  violation of ICNAF quotas. The scope of 
the Pelly Amendment was expanded during Congressional 
debate to include  all  species of fish  and by later  amendments 
to include  endangered  and  threatened  species  under  management 
by an international  commission. 
Under  the  Pelly  Amendment,  if the secretary of commerce 
determines  that  nationals of a foreign  country are conducting 
fishing operations that threaten an  internationally  managed  and 
endangered species, the secretary is to “certify such  fact to the 
President. ” Upon  receiving a letter  of  certification,  the  president 
has  the  discretion of directing the secretary of the treasury  to 
prohibit the import of fish or wildlife from the offending 
country.  Within 60 days  of receiving  certification  the  president 
must report to Congress on the action taken or the reasons 
for inaction. 
The  second  U.S.  statute is 1979 Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment to the 1976 Fisheries  Conservation  and  Management 
Act  (FCMA) . Under  this  amendment  the  secretary  of  commerce 
is to determine  when nationals of a foreign  country are directly or 
indirectly  conducting  operations  that  diminish  the  effectiveness 
of the  IWC.  In  addition to certification  of  the president, the 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment requires the secretary of 
state to reduce, by not less than 50%, any foreign fishing 
allocation  that  the  certified  country  might  hold  in U. S .territorial 
waters, which were extended outward to 200 nautical miles 
under  the  FCMA. If the conditions  giving rise to certification 
exist  one  year  later,  then  any  remaining  foreign  fishing  allocation 
is to be rescinded, with no future allocation allowed until 
“decertification. ” 
In 1973 the IWC  set a quota  on  the  harvest  of  minke  whales  in 
the Southern  Hemisphere.  Japan  and  the  Soviet  Union  formally 
objected to the quota. Under provisions of the convention 
creating the IWC,  member  countries  lodging a formal  objection 
to  an  IWC regulation are not  legally  bound  by  such  regulations. 
Japan  and the Soviet  Union  allegedly  harvested  more  than  the 
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total quota, and even though they were not technically in 
violation of  IWC rules,  the  secretary of commerce  certified  both 
countries  under  the  Pelly  Amendment.  Then-President  Gerald 
Ford  declined  to  take  action,  reporting  to  Congress  that  Japan 
and  the  Soviet  Union  had  agreed  to  abide  by  future  IWC  quotas. 
In 1978 the  Pelly  Amendment  was  employed  in  response  to 
the  whaling  practices of Chile,  Peru and  the  Republic  of  Korea. 
At the  time,  none  of  these  countries was  a  member  of  the  IWC 
and was therefore not in violation of IWC quota or other 
international  aws.  Then-President  Jimmy  Carter  received 
certification  claiming  that  the  harvest  of  whales by these  three 
countries was diminishing the effectiveness of the  IWC. 
President  Carter  declined  to  impose  sanctions  on  the  grounds 
that  all  three  countries  were  in  the  process of joining  the IWC. 
Many  in  Congress  felt  that  the  inaction by Presidents  Ford  and 
Carter  after  certification  under  the  Pelly  Amendment  was  an 
indication that too much discretion had been given to the 
president.  The  Packwood-Magnuson  Amendment  was  an 
attempt  to  reduce  this  discretion  through  the  automatic  reduction, 
if  applicable,  in  foreign  fishing  allocations. 
In 1986 the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  agreed  to  review  lower  court 
decisions  in  the  case Japan  Whaling  Association v. American 
Cetacean Society. At issue was the  discretion  of  the  secretary 
of commerce  to  certify  a  country  harvesting  in  excess of  an IWC 
quota. The American Cetacean Society maintained that the 
secretary was required under  Packwood-Magnuson  to  certify 
any  country  in  violation  of  an  IWC  quota.  The  case  arose  when 
in 1982 the  IWC  established  a  zero  quota  for  sperm  whales  for 
the 1983-84 season  and  a  complete  moratorium  on  commercial 
whaling  in 1986. Japan,  consistent  with  its  right  under the IWC, 
filed  objections  to  these  measures.  The  U.S.  negotiated  an  agree- 
ment  with  Japan  whereby  they  would  restrict  their  harvest  of 
sperm whales and abide by the IWC moratorium by 1988. 
Despite  this  agreement  the  American  Cetacean  Society  sought 
a writ of mandamus to  compel  the  secretary  of  commerce  to 
certify  Japan. Both the  Federal  District  Court  of  Columbia  and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals  granted  the  writ.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court  overturned  these  decisions,  concluding  that  neither  the 
language  nor  the  legislative  history  of  the  Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment obliged the secretary of commerce to certify a 
foreign  country  in  violation  of  an  IWC  quota. 
In 1985 the  Soviet  Union  was  certified  for  harvesting  minke 
whales, even though it had formally objected to the IWC 
moratorium.  They  lost 50 % of  their  fishery  allocations  in U. S . 
waters.  The  Soviets  continued  their  harvest of minke  whales 
and  lost  the  remainder  of  their  fishery  allocation  in  the  following 
year.  In  late 1987 the  Soviet  Union  announced an end to  all 
commercial  whaling  and  it was decertified  in  early 1988. 
Norway had also objected to the IWC moratorium and 
continued  whaling  without  being  in  contravention  of  the  IWC . 
Norway  was  certified  in mid-1987 under  the  Pelly  Amendment. 
Then-President  Reagan  declined  to  impose  any  trade  sanctions, 
since  Norway  had  also  announced  its  intent o cease  commercial 
whaling. 
In  the  late 1980s several  countries  were  harvesting  whales 
for  “research”  purposes.  A  scientific committee within the IWC 
had the  authority  to  approve or disapprove  research  programs 
involving  the  harvest  of  whales.  Research  programs  proposed 
by the  Republic  of  Korea,  Iceland,  Japan  and  Norway  all  came 
under  scrutiny by U.S.  officials  and  environmental  groups  as 
well.  After  consultation  with  the U.S., the  Republic  of  Korea 
decided to terminate its research program. In 1988 Norway 
proposed a harvest of 35 minke whales from the stock in 
the Northeast Atlantic. The IWC rejected the proposal, but 
Norway  went  ahead  with  its  scientific  harvest. In subsequent 
meetings, Norway was able to convince U.S. officials that 
their  research  program  was bona Jide and  they  were  able  to 
avoid  certification. 
Iceland  was  also  threatened  with  certification  and  subsequently 
modified  its  scientific  program to placate  U.S.  interests.  The 
controversial  program  of  scientific  whaling by Japan  is  discussed 
in  the  first  section  of  this  paper.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  no  action 
was  taken  under  the  Pelly  Amendment.  Japan  was  no  longer 
fishing in U.S. waters and U.S. trade sanctions were not 
imposed  because  Japan  imports  more  fish  from  the  U.S.  than 
it  exports  to  the U.S. Japan  thus had  a  credible  threat  of  trade 
retaliation. 
The  use  of  the  Pelly  and  Packwood-Magnuson  amendments 
has  given  IWC  regulations  an  economic  clout,  particularly  for 
Iceland  and  Norway.  While  neither  country  is  fishing  in  the  U.S. 
Economic  Zone,  both  countries  have  historically  exported  fish 
to  the  U.S.  Iceland  has  exported  fresh and frozen c6d, while 
Norway had, until a recent embargo, exported pen-raised 
salmon.  Norway  and  Iceland are relatively  small  countries  in 
economic comparison to Japan, which, because of its trade 
position,  is  in  a  stronger  position  to  object  to  and  ignore  IWC 
policies. 
If the IWC were to allow the resumption of commercial 
whaling,  particularly  coastal  whaling  within  the  territorial  waters 
of  Japan,  Iceland  and  Norway,  it  would  give  it  a  legitimacy 
that  might  reduce  the  environmental  backlash  in  nonwhaling 
countries. If the  IWC  extends  the  moratorium  and  Norway  and 
Japan  formally  object or, like  Iceland,  withdraw  from the IWC 
and  unilaterally  resume  whaling,  there  will be stronger  pressure 
from  environmental  groups  and  the  U.S.  Congress  to  impose 
sanctions  via  the  Pelly  and  Packwood-Magnuson  amendments. 
The  whaling  industry  and  many  government  officials  in  these 
three  countries  are  angered by  the IWC, which  they  view as 
having  been  captured by “preservationists,”  and by the U.S., 
which  they  view as arrogant  in  its  attempted  use  of  economic 
power  to  impose  its  environmental  ethic  on  other  cultures  (see 
the press release by the Ministry of Fisheries, Reykjavik, 
Iceland, 27 December 1991). Japan  in  particular  feels  that  the 
U.S. is being hypocritical in its consumption of meat from 
domestic  livestock  and  the  hunting  of  big  game  while  labelling 
the  consumption  of  whale  meat by the  Japanese  as  immoral  (see 
the  Seattle TimedPost-Intelligencer, 30 June 1991 :A12). 
CONCLUSIONS 
There  is now considerable  scientific  evidence to suggest  that 
several  species  of  baleen  whale and  possibly  the  sperm  whale 
have  recovered  to  levels  that  would  support  commercial  harvest. 
The  stock  of  fin  whales off the  coast  of  Iceland  (Palsson, 1991), 
the  minke  whale  in  the  Northeast  Atlantic (Pien, 1991) and  the 
minke whale in the Southern Ocean (Institute of Cetacean 
Research, 1991) are prime  candidates  for  commercial  harvest. 
Japan,  Iceland and Norway  have  an  economic  interest  in  the 
resumption  of  commercial  whaling,  which  they  believe  can  be 
done  without  risking  stock  extinction r incurring  the  economic 
inefficiencies  of  open  access. 
Management  of  the  stock  of  minke  whales  in  the  Northeast 
Atlantic  is  analyzed  through  a  bioeconomic  model.  A  delay- 
